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In 1961, President Kennedy announced an initia- 
tive to land a man (you would now say a human) 
on the Moon and return him safely to Earth. It was 
a political statement, and everybody knows that. 
However, it represented a straightforward, simple 
mandate to an engineering organization such as 
NASA. Engineers really like, culturally, to receive 
sets of requirements and turn out a product de- 
signed to satisfy those requirements. Apollo, in 
sonie sense, was an ideal example. The task to 
accomplish was specific: land a human being on 
the Moon, and get him or her back safely back to 
Earth. Within that context, they could build trans- 
portation systems and develop the technology nec- 
essary to accomplish that. 
It was a very happy time. NASA had a lot of 
money and a lot of support from the nation. The 
task was a very important thing to do, so it was 
pleasant duty and a lot of fun in a new organization. 
As the Apollo program actually started to come to 
fruition in the late 19603, questions arose as to 
what to do next for an encore and how to continue 
this line of discovery. There were things called 
Apollo applications, aimed at extending stay times 
on the Moon and so on. 
In fact, President Nixon in 1968 asked Vice- 
President Agnew to head up a Space Task Group 
to draw up a set of plans beyond Apollo. That report 
is really interesting to read because it talks about 
space stations, lunar bases, and bases on Mars. If 
you look at the time-lines, funding curves and 
schedules in that report, we should have been on 
Mars about 5 to 8 years ago; by now we should 
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have a permanent base up there, along with the 
permanent base on the Moon. 
Well, that didn’t happen. What really happen- 
ed, of course, was that when this plan was taken 
to the Office of Management and Budget by 
NASA’s Administrator, Tom Paine, he was basically 
told, “No way- we’ve got budget cuts to deal with.” 
I have read the history books; I wasn’t there. 
The history books and the analyses say that Dr. 
Paine just was not aware of the level of political 
difficulty he was in at the time he presented his 
plan. He went directly to the President to argue that 
this ought to be done, ought to be accomplished, 
and he lost. And when you go directly to the Pres- 
ident and lose, you can really lose big. 
President Nixon had other priorities on his mind 
-the Viet Nam war for one, and the Great Society 
program that Lyndon Johnson had put through the 
Congress which now had to be funded. Those two 
things were getting a lot of attention in the Con- 
gress. Funding for the space program seemed like 
a luxury. After all, we did beat the Russians to the 
Moon; perhaps it was time to move on. 
NASA backed off its plans for bases on the 
Moon and on Mars and, instead, proposed an 
Earth-orbiting manned Space Station. That pro- 
posal was cut back in negotiations with the Nixon 
Administration until the only piece left was an 
Earth-to-orbit logistics vehicle, which came to be 
called the Space Shuttle. 
The design philosophy of the Space Shuttle 
was to lower launch costs to orbit by analogy to the 
operation of airlines: build a small number of vehi- 
cles and keep them flying through rapid turnaround 
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onqhe ground. According to testimony to Congress 
in the early 197O’s, the Shuttle would fly 50 times 
a year and, therefore, the launch cost to Earth orbit 
would fall dramatically. It didn’t work ,that way, and 
the reasons,were not necessarily all technical. 
Some design decisions on the Shuttle program 
reflect requirements set by the military (whose 
support was needed in Congress) and by restric- 
tive budgets. 
If you look at the history of NASA during the 
1970’s, you find it preoccupied with making the 
Shuttle work and with planning a Space Station. 
The whole context of space exploration set by the 
plans of the Space Task Group somehow got drop- 
ped from the corporate memory. Gradually, activi- 
ties called “Advanced Planning” in NASA were 
eliminated. 
In 1980, the Space Shuttle, behind schedule 
and having difficulties, still had not flown its first 
mission. The new Reagan Administration had 
come in under a banner of austerity and less gov- 
ernment, intending to cut spending and eliminate 
programs. Of course that sent a tremor of fear 
through the Federal bureaucracy, of which I am a 
part. 
The new NASA Deputy Administrator, appoint- 
ed in the very beginning of the Reagan Administra- 
tion, also had very definite ideas about priorities 
within the space program. He made known his 
opinion that the limited resources of the Agency 
ought to be put into making the Shuttle work. That 
might mean cutting back on other things, among 
them the planetary exploration program. In fact, the 
rumor mill said that the planetary science budget 
was going to zero over three years, leaving the 
Agency to concentrate on manned exploration. At 
some point in time, once the Shuttle was an oper- 
ational vehicle, we would resurrect the planetary 
programs, like Lazarus, and start exploring the 
solar system again. That scenario sent shock 
waves through the scientific community (of which I 
was a part), and a number of things happened. 
Our particular group, being civil servants, 
couldn’t participate in activities like Political Action 
Committees being formed by scientific societies. 
We looked at strategic planning taking place in the 
NASA Headquarters Planetary Program Office in 
response to this and felt it was flawed. We were 
forced to reexamine our performance as a scientific 
research group to understand how to restructure 
and set priorities to remain competitive in what 
would be a highly restricted funding environment. 
We formed some internal committees to examine 
various options. 
One of the things we revisited was the Lunar 
Polar Orbiter, a mission we had proposed in the 
early 1970’s but which had -never flown. In its 
original incarnation it was to have been a very 
minimal mission, intended to be launched on a 
Delta rocket to the Moon. However, under the 
guidelines of the early 1980’s such a mission would 
fly on the Space Shuttle; the increased payload 
capacity of the Shuttle over a Delta would give the 
whole mission a great deal of capability. Thus, it 
seemed like a good idea to look into the technical 
issues associated with launching a lunar satellite 
from the Space Shuttle and become acquainted 
with a very broad spectrum of opportunities and 
possibilities in this “future space program.” We 
could accomplish this at the Johnson Space Center 
by walking across the campus and talking to the 
engineers. 
Those of you who don’t work in NASA may not 
be aware how little working level communication 
there is between the engineering side and the 
science side. Even though located at the Field 
Center for manned flight, as a scientific organiza- 
tion, we rarely dealt with the engineers in the 
manned programs. Our time was spent with indi- 
vidual research projects and conferences about 
the planets and so on. However, at this point we 
had a real need to talk to those guys. 
We made a couple of rather startling finds (to 
us) about NASA’s future. We, of course, knew 
about the Space Shuttle, but we learned that it was 
called the National Space Transportation System, 
a name which implied there was something more 
to it than just the Shuttle itself. A Space Station was 
on the drawing boards and, back in the dusty 
corners, engineers were talking about spaceships 
called Orbital Transfer Vehicles (OW) that could 
carry payloads from a Space Station into high 
orbits. These hypothetical vehicles (which would 
exist in the mid 1990’s) would be able to take 
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payloads not only to places like geostationary orbit 
but also literally to lunar orbit, without any changes 
in their propulsive capability. 
That connection lit a great light bulb in my brain 
- for scientists who were interested in the Moon, 
the late 90’s were going to be a real Golden Age, 
a new era of discovery. As this transportation ca- 
pability came into service, our little dinky payloads 
could go up there all the time, collecting data on 
the Moon. Probably there would be a base on the 
Moon and other activities beyond low Earth orbit. 
Exploring these possibilities within NASA, we 
found that such ideas were considered crazy stuff. 
NASA was having plenty of trouble getting a Space 
Station - if we were to talk about the Moon, then 
Congress will never allocate money for the Space 
Station. This type of thinking seemed to imply that 
the space program would never be more than a 
short term activity. We could not accept that, so we 
started an effort to map the long range structure of 
the space program. 
At the very beginning of this activity, in early 
1982, we began a collaboration with the Los Ala- 
mos National Laboratories, where we discovered 
(accidentally) that similar discussions were taking 
place. Jointly our group and the Los Alamos group 
developed a set of premises about space develop- 
ment, and then began expanding the dialogue to 
senior people in the space business who also had 
concerns about the future. Principally, we con- 
cluded that it was inappropriate to think of a Space 
Station or a lunar base as simply “a next logical 
step” as NASA moved from one project to another. 
What we were really looking at was the very begin- 
nings of a process of moving human beings off the 
planet into the solar system. 
Unfortunately, characterizing NASA programs 
in terms of grand, historical processes was not 
acceptable to the internal bureaucracy. That kind 
of talk was considered fantasy, given perennially 
tight budgets. Thus, our first step was to get the 
idea across that it was actually okay to talk in such 
terms. In other words, we needed to legitimize the 
concept of human exploration of space in general 
and the idea of a lunar base in particular. To that 
end we employed a number of tools such as work- 
shops, lectures, sessions at technical conferences, 
’ 0 %  and articles in the public media. I have a number 
of clippings from 1983 and 1984 that talk about 
lunar bases as if they were part of the NASA 
pantheon even though the agency itself was doing 
almost nothing in the field. 
This orchestrated legitimization process led to 
a conference in 1984 that we held at the National 
Academy of Sciences resulting in the book that 
some of you have seen, entitled Lunar Bases and 
Space Activities of the 27st Century. 
In fate 1984 and in 1985, other people began 
arguing for piloted missions to Mars. Carl Sagan 
and Jack Schmitt were both lobbying James 
Beggs, the NASA Administrator, about missions to 
Mars for totally different reasons. Sagan wanted to 
go to Mars with the Russians as a world project to 
resolve global political tensions through technolog- 
ical cooperation. Jack Schmitt thought the Rus- 
sians were going to do it and leave us behind in the 
dust. 
Beggs realized that NASA had not thought very 
much about going to Mars in the Shuttle Era. In late 
1984 he called the Director of the Johnson Space 
Center because he knew that a group there had 
been working on some of these ideas. Beggs ask- 
ed that they put together a NASA-wide study to 
review how we would reply to the President if he 
said, “Go to Mars!” That study was done in about 
six months in the first half of 1985 and was pub- 
lished in 1986 as a Marshall Space Flight Center 
document. 
At about that time, Congress mandated the 
President to appoint a National Commission on 
Space (NCOS) to look at the long range future. 
President Reagan finally did that, after some delay, 
in early 1985. 
These activities began to gather some momen- 
tum and start to be recognized in some sense, but 
future goals never got on the charts (NASA view- 
graphs). For example, in the justifications for a 
Space Station, the top reason was microgravity 
research or commercial development or better ball 
bearings. An engineer once told me after one of my 
presentations that I was talking about transporta- 
tion of human beings into space and that was the 
seventh of seven reasons for the Space Station. I 
acknowledged the problem but emphasized that I 
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sa% the Space Station not so much as a research 
laboratory but rather as a stepping stone toward 
permanent human presence in space. 
By the end of 1985 a new paradigm for the 
Space Station was beginning to emerge in a lot of 
people’s minds, but it was still not manifested in any 
way in NASA officialdom. That was the state of 
affairs in early 1986 when the Challenger disaster 
occurred. The NCOS had its report ready to pres- 
ent to the President, and this terrible thing hap- 
pened. 
However, one of the results of the Challenger 
explosion was the bursting of the bubble of the 
Shuttle fantasy in the High Councils. At the time the 
system was working toward 16 flights a year and 
not 50 any more, but even that goal was beginning 
to be seen as a tough problem. A realization was 
dawning that the vehicle was essentially a research 
and development tool, not an operational system. 
There was real risk involved. NASA suffered a 
great deal of examination and critique. 
Nevertheless, the Challenger tragedy gener- 
ated a tremendous outpouring of public support. I 
think people at the top of NASA were surprised by 
the positive feelings because they live in a highly 
political environment in Washington, DC where 
they are constantly beset by negative and critical 
views. That is really all they hear. Do you want 
homes in space, or do you want homes for the 
homeless? This is the trade you are making. I think 
that even though they may have known intellectu- 
ally that there were people who loved the space 
program, the support that came oul in the national 
media and everywhere was something of a sur- 
prise. And it encouraged them to think more about 
the future. 
The NASA Administrator accepted the NCOS 
report and later that year asked Sally Ride to study 
possible future initiatives for the U.S. space pro- 
gram. Neither the NCOS operation nor the Ride 
Study was large enough to have an independent 
technical staff. Both groups had to draw on preex- 
isting information, and almost all of the recent stuff 
was our bootlegged work of the previous four or 
five years on lunar bases and the Mars mission 
study. Most of it was very conceptual, but it became 
the basis for much thinking. 
The National Commission on Space report, 
Pioneering the Space Frontier, had a very grand 
vision that philosophically broached the question 
of human settlement of the solar system. Later, that 
idea appeared in the Reagan space policy of Feb- 
ruary 1988. Thus the report was very important, 
even though people thought of it as a “blue-sky” 
study destined to molder on the shelf. It created an 
important philosophical basis for things that would 
come later. 
The Sally Ride study posed four grand options 
for NASA: Mission to Planet Earth (which you 
heard about last night); Robotic Exploration of the 
Solar System; Outpost on the Moon; and Piloted 
Missions to Mars. Those sound like four distinct 
choices but, in reality, they are different scales of 
activity. As I said earlier, I have to agree with Me1 
Averner that Mission to Planet Earth is really not in 
the same league as Outpost on the Moon or Mis- 
sions to Mars. When you really look at a Mission to 
Planet Earth program, even on as grand a scale as 
has now developed, it is something like a factor of 
five or so smaller than a lunar base program. A 
Mars program started from scratch is probably 
another factor of two larger than a lunar base 
program in terms of expense. 
NASA formed an organization called the Office 
of Exploration (OExp) to continue the work of the 
Ride Report and to explore these options in more 
detail. However, that organization was chartered to 
study mainly the Moon and Mars missions. It was 
assumed that the planetary exploration element is 
really being taken care of very well within the 
current offices of NASA. The Mission to Planet 
Earth is really something a little broader and larger 
than NASA, not necessarily a NASA program and 
not of the ultimate scale of human exploration of 
the solar system. 
Office of Exploration began its work, I guess, in 
late 1986. In December of that year, the NASA 
Administrator circulated a memo to all NASA em- 
ployees declaring that one of NASA’s major goals 
was to expand human presence beyond the Earth 
into the solar system. Little notice was taken of that 
statement, but it was echoed about a year later in 
the February 1988 space policy issued by the 
Reagan Administration. That was really important 
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for it allowed NASA to actually think about human 
space exploration in terms of long range goals. You 
have no idea how important it is to a bureaucratic 
government organization to be given permission to 
think about strategic issues. 
Given that permission, the Office of Exploration 
took it upon themselves to come up with a long term 
strategy for the space program. However, they first 
felt a need to educate themselves about the impli- 
cations of various choices. Let’s take “Outpost on 
the Moon”, for example. A lunar base could be a 
Chevette or a Cadillac. You can just put people up 
there, plant the flag, and bring them home; or you 
can establish the beginnings of communities. 
What about bases on Mars? Do we go there, 
land a couple of places, and say, well, we did that, 
i.e., “Little Jack Horner sat in a corner, stuck in his 
thumb, pulled out a plum, said, ‘What a good boy 
am I ’ ? ”  
There are all sorts of scales to these things, 
and we don’t always understand what it means to 
adopt one or the other of these scenarios. The 
Office of Exploration wanted to provide recommen- 
dations, alternatives in the early 1990’s. The target 
date for a final recommendation was 1992: the 
500th anniversary of the discovery of America, the 
International Space Year. 
Rather than sit down and try to develop a plan 
immediately, they chose to do a series of home- 
work problems. The approach was to formulate a 
series of problem statements of the sort you might 
find at the end of a textbook chapter. Solving these 
exercises would give insights to the workings of the 
methodology and to the implications of various 
decisions. They were very careful to refer to their 
work as “case studies”, not scenarios. The word 
“scenario”, as Gerry Soffen pointed out earlier, 
implies that you have converged to a plan. If the 
press thinks you are developing a scenario, they 
assume the it is the first draft of the final plan. In 
reality, we were doing practice runs, and they were 
called case studies to emphasize that. 
In that process they arrived at some general- 
izations from these case studies. One was a clas- 
sification called Human Expeditions, or “flags and 
footprints” as it is called informally. A human expe- 
dition means that vou are iust demonstratina caDa- 
% 
bility and, perhaps, collecting information. The 
Lewis and Clark Expedition explored and reported 
back but didn’t leave behind any outposts or settle- 
ments. If a facility or some scientific experiments is 
established which can be revisited, we refer to it as 
an outpost. An outpost does not have to be perma- 
nently staffed. 
Finally, there is a rather revolutionary notion 
called Evolutionary Expansion in which a perma- 
nent presence is established with an intent to grow 
to self-sufficiency in an economic or material 
sense. This latter concept begins to transcend a 
simple programmatic decision and has the poten- 
tial to inaugurate a historical process. 
I came to the conclusion some time ago that 
the inevitable maturation of space transportation 
technology implied that the human race was ready 
to begin permanent settlement off the Earth. The 
only question in my mind was whether Americans 
would be leaders in this process, whether our 
values and ideals would become part of the foun- 
dations of space-faring societies. 
A vague, philosophical idea like evolutionary 
expansion is difficult to deal with in an engineering- 
oriented organization such as NASA because it 
doesn’t immediately lead to a set of requirements 
against which engineers can design machines, or 
give you a series of steps toward a specific goal. 
So I sat in interesting meetings, watching the mind 
trained in the engineering culture struggle with 
really philosophical issues where you had to derive 
what you wanted to do from a general cultural 
imperative. That was a very difficult exercise within 
this organization, but some good progress was 
made, ultimately. 
One case study, or problem statement, inves- 
tigated was a human expedition to Phobos. By 
landing on Phobos, you don’t have carry the mass 
with you to land on Mars. The objective is to get 
somebody into the Martian system as quickly as 
possible with technology that you have at hand. 
That was the intent of studying that issue. It didn’t 
necessarily mean that they were trying to advocate 
landing only on Phobos. In fact, the case study 
included robotic exploration of the surface of Mars, 
using teleoperation from Phobos as a base. This is 
an old idea that Fred Singer came up with as part 
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of VIIS PhD thesis, I think in the 1950’s. It may even 
predate Fred, I don’t really know, but he certainly 
popularized the idea. 
Doing this problem forced you into some on- 
orbit operatioqs, but required only modest mass in 
low Earth orbit (LEO) and less time for program 
development - characteristics which made it an 
important case to understand. Of course, a lot of 
people thought it was just crazy to go to the Mars 
system and not land on the planet. Therefore, you 
also had to include the case study involving human 
exploration of Mars. 
In that study it became clear that the Space 
Station was needed for assembly in LEO because 
you can’t bring up everything at once in big pieces. 
On Mars we have robotic exploration of the Martian 
moons instead of vice versa. Much technology 
development and operations experience was 
needed at the Space Station, particularly research 
in life sciences. 
As I sat in the meetings in 1985 for the Manned 
Mars Mission study, I had realized for the first time 
how much the decisions related to the Mars mis- 
sions were driven by our ignorance of the life 
sciences. Our limitation was not engineering or 
ability to design the transportation systems - our 
limitation was our understanding of the human 
being and how that human being might adapt and 
perform on a three year round trip. That kind of 
experience is like the old sailing voyages around 
the world in the 16th century. 
Mars landing requires a lot of vehicular and 
space systems infrastructure within a launch win- 
dow that opens only once every 26 months. A huge 
spaceship has to be built in LEO, and if you happen 
to fall behind schedule a few weeks, you maintain 
it there for another 26 months. An enormous man- 
agement operation is involved just to meet that 
schedule. Something like 500 tons of propellants 
alone have to be shipped to orbit once you have 
built the spacecraft - an imposing challenge, con- 
sidering how we do business today. 
The case study designed to evaluate lunar 
activity was taken to be a science outpost on the 
far side, using an optical interferometer located on 
the lunar surface - an idea Bernie Burke pub- 
lished first in a book which I edited, Lunar Bases 
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and Space Activities of the 27st Century. The lunar 
surface is extraordinarily stable platform and there- 
fore a unique location for the elements of an optical 
interferometer. We are examining now the broader 
and broader categories of scientific experiments 
that are possible on the Moon but not possible on 
the Earth or in orbit somewhere. 
Of course, the more traditional sort of concept 
is the Arecibo style radiotelescope in a crater. This 
idea appears in NASA viewgraphs as early as 
1971. I have always thought this scale of project 
was pretty ambitious and only a nice thing for artists 
to draw. However, at a symposium on Astronomy 
from the Moon, held in 1986, Frank Drake pointed 
out that the Arecibo telescope in Puerto Rico is built 
suspended from only three pylons on the sides of 
the crater. All the structure is supported by cables. 
When you realize that, the civil engineering prob- 
lem doesn’t seem nearly so difficult. 
The lunar case study focussed on operating a 
long duration science facility on the Moon that 
would be man-tended but not necessarily perma- 
nently manned. Clearly, substantial scientific capa- 
bility could be put on the Moon within a relatively 
short time. Massive human presence is not re- 
quired, but human interaction would greatly en- 
hance the performance of the installation in terms 
of maintenance and change-out of instruments. 
The mass launched to LEO to do this kind of 
operation on the Moon is much less than for Mars 
missions. 
Finally, there was a case study called evolu- 
tionary expansion. A long time was occupied in 
even getting a grip on what that meant. It was not 
studied as deeply because there were so many 
false starts over its formulation. Nevertheless, one 
of the ideas very prominent in evolutionary expan- 
sion was to somehow use the Moon as an outpost 
early on to build your infrastructure, test your sys- 
tems, and learn how to live on planets. It might even 
be possible to increase your ability to operate in 
space with oxygen production on the lunar surface. 
Thus, lunar activities really become a building 
block on the way from Space Station to Mars to the 
rest of the solar system. This idea of achieving 
plateaus or “terraces” in capability and technology 
has often been advocated by Peter Glaser. 
Now, that turns out to be the idea that is mani- 
fested in President Bush’s speech of July 20, 1989. 
A lot of people, particularly reporters, complained 
to me that the speech was “wimpy” because the 
President didn’t give any schedules or details or 
cost figures. I disagreed and, in fact, thought it to 
be extraordinarily important because, as Lee Tilton 
of Stennis Space Center said to me last night, it cut 
off almost all the branches from this vast decision 
tree that NASA likes to build. NASA has the idea, 
and probably rightly so, that it should not make 
policy decisions. NASA only can provide options to 
someone else, presumably the President, who will 
make a decision. All these studies going on inside 
NASA are suddenly now coming to a screeching 
halt, and we can really start to focus on specific 
tasks and accomplishments. 
I personally believe that the approach enunci- 
ated by the President is the right one. It is one that 
I have been talking about for a few years, anyway. 
This way, you end up with a fairly complex infra- 
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structure including lunar surface activities, (ma$be 
manufactured propellants), science laboratories, 
and vehicles going to Mars. Most importantly, there 
is an interconnection between things that happen 
in planetary exploration and things that happen on 
the Moon. We have sort of a building block ap- 
proach. 
The Evolutionary Expansion case study car- 
ried out space development and exploration in a 
gradual buildup through the Space Station to the 
surface of the Moon. As I mentioned earlier, my 
experience with the Manned Mars Mission studies 
in 1985 persuaded me that the critical path deci- 
sions in the Human Exploration Initiative require 
prominent programs in life science research. The 
role of the Space Station ought to be to address 
these issues. The concept of the research labora- 
tory in space in materials science could be satisfied 
by Joe Allen and his crew with the Industrial Space 
Facility or its NASA-generated generic equivalent. 
Astronomers and Earth-observing scientists have 
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plafforms for their work which are probably more 
suitable than a vibrating, dirty manned Space Sta- 
tion. 
Finally, there is the new concept of establishing 
permanent icfrastructure on a planetary surface. 
Among the communities that I have been able to 
get interested in this latter point are the civil engi- 
neers and the process industry. As I have pointed 
out to them, historically, you have explorers who 
open the frontiers and who are the demigods and 
celebrities. The builders and settlers come after 
them. To my mind, there is no fundamental reason 
why the Space Station has to be built by rocket 
scientists rather than civil engineers. 
A more obvious case is a lunar base where you 
have construction, manufacturing, processing, and 
general logistics support taking place. If such a 
facility were being designed and constructed on the 
Earth, you would not find NASA involved. For this 
kind of work you go to Bechtel or Shimizu in Japan 
or Brown & Root or some other constructor-engi- 
neer company. They have the relevant experience 
but are not now involved in the space program. 
When we describe these surface infrastructure 
elements to those companies, their reaction is that 
it is a piece of cake but flying to the Moon is 
impossible. When we go to NASA the reaction is 
that getting to the Moon is straightforward but 
building that stuff is impossible. There is no expe- 
rience in either community that gives confidence in 
the unfamiliar element. We are trying to close this 
gap, and it has been closed to some extent within 
the Office of Exploration. 
I have pulled out are a few charts from standard 
NASA packages that list life science "tall poles" 
(Figure 1). We can see issues in medical care, zero 
or low gravity countermeasures, artificial gravity, 
radiation, life support, and human factors, which is 
often ignored in NASA. Crew interactions are very 
much more, I think, an integral part of the Soviet 
program. They have more concern with these 
things than NASA does, particularly crew psycho- 
logical relationships. Extravehicular activity is an- 
other question, which is as much a space suit 
technology issue as it is a human issue. 
All of these things begin with the Space Station 
Breakeven Points: Physico-Chemical vs. Bioregenerative 
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Figure 2. Breakeven points for physico-chemical vs. bioregenerative life support systems for space missions. 
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Freedom, which gives you the long duration expe- 
rience, life science research, advanced technol- 
ogy, and so on. Notice how high these Space 
Station research issues fall on the chart. That is a 
real change that comes from working on a real 
problem rather than from generation of rationale for 
the Space Station by making it up, as in some 
sense was done in the original proposals. 
In the Lunar Evolution concept you want to try 
to understand the requirements for permanent, 
self-supporting facilities. Those are really impor- 
tant words: “permanent self-supporting.” You also 
want the capability to be a learning center for long 
duration planetary missions. So that is a good 
analogy to what you guys are doing here at the 
Biosphere 2 Project, developing a learning center 
and working to be self-supporting and so on. 
I have some other charts that were given to me 
by Barney Roberts, but were given to him by Hatice 
Cullingford, who has been working on some of the 
CELSS requirements. These are really things 
which Me1 Averner knows more about than I do. I 
have run overtime, so I will just pull out a couple of 
the major ones. 
I want to ask you about this chart, Mel, because 
I wonder about it. This chart (Figure 2) shows that 
we have learned enough about CELSS during 
1981 to 1989 that our crossover point for replacing 
physical, chemical regenerative systems becomes 
mission durations on the order of a year. Is that 
correct? 
Me/ Averner: “First, like you, I had some 
questions about that. The calculations 
a r e  b a s e d  o n  a study done  by 
Lockheed. I recently talked to a Boeing 
Aerospace person who independently 
did the same study from their own point 
of view and they came out with exactly 
the same results of a break-even point 
of about one year. So l now have a good 
deal more confidence in the report. ” 
That conclusion is an important one, and new 
to me. It is important because that implies that 
projects like lunar bases ought to start investing 
more in this technology and put more emphasis on 
it than in the past. It really makes bioregenerative 
1 .  * 
life support a major issue of technology develop- 
ment. I am not sure that this knowledge is reflected 
in the current planning that is going on. This is sort 
of new information, so it is something we really 
need to work on in getting it into the NASA plans. 
Another question is whether we can take and 
derive the lunar habitat from the Space Station 
Freedom with some new technology and then up- 
grade it to 8 to 12 people, using more and more 
CELSS technology. I think the pathway that we 
choose from here through this will be extraordinar- 
ily important to efficiently and quickly provide the 
capability for human beings to live and work in 
space. Thus, closely connected with all these hum- 
an exploration goals are some very important and 
exciting requirements for the life sciences. 
It is very sensitive to talk about the report in 
preparation to the President right now (The 90 Day 
Report on the Human Exploration Initiative, au- 
thored by Aaron Cohen, NASA Johnson Space 
Center), but the thinking is couched in terms of an 
emplacement phase, a consolidation phase, and 
the utilization phase both on the Moon and on 
Mars. Much of the technology emphasis is on the 
Moon because we want to develop these systems, 
make sure they are reliable, and make sure they 
work in a low gravity environment before we entrust 
peoples’ lives to them all the way to the planet 
Mars. The Moon is a more forgiving place due to 
its accessibility by the transportation system. 
I would like to conclude with a reflection. This 
is a magical time, when we have an opportunity 
within the space program to embark on a truly 
grand and historical process of human exploration 
of the solar system. If we can figure how to do that 
within the constraints imposed by our society and 
the international environment, there is an opportu- 
nity - particularly for the younger people here - 
to be part of one of the grandest occurrences in the 
whole history of the human race. We can actually 
talk about the beginnings of a multi-planet species. 
The important issues are the ones that Joe Allen 
raised in his talk - not necessarily the technical 
ones, but those having to do with the institutional 
and management structures. Those issues are not 
as clear and easy to address as are the nuts and 
bolts, the calculations and the physics. 
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